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1.  Introduction
Around the globe,  the demand for environmental quality is  growing.
In some cases,  as  in the  impact of acid rain on forests,  the growing
demand for environmental quality has met a shrinking supply.  In other
cases, environmental quality has improved but supply growth has been
outstripped by the growth  in demand.  Throughout the world, major efforts
are now underway by national governments to  increase  the supply of
environmental quality.  National governments acting alone  can, in
principle, be successful  in improving environmental quality when the
sources of pollution are  located within the government's jurisdiction.
This is  not possible, however, when the domestic pollution originates
abroad as  is  the case with international air  and water pollution and their
consequences, including acid rain, the greenhouse effect, or  the
degradation of the earth's ozone  layer.  In essence,  the rules  that govern
the regulation of transboundary pollution, i.e.  of pollution that crosses
the boundaries of autonomous jurisdictions, represent an international
institution and thus an international public good.  No government can
supply itself with such a good other than  in cooperation with other
countries.  Here, we define cooperation as one country's  reduction in the
externality conditional upon other countries doing the same.
*) Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of
Minnesota and Department of Economics, University of Northern Colorado
respectively.  Research was made possible by a Grant from the United
States Department of Agriculture.  Address:  University of Minnesota, St.
Paul;  Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics;  248 Classroom
Office Building;  1994 Buford Avenue;  St. Paul, MN  55108, phone  (612)
625-1712.  The authors wish to thank T. Graham-Tomasi, Ulrich Hausner, L.
Hurwicz, and C. Ford Runge, for their helpful comments  on earlier drafts
of the paper.  We claim the property rights to  any remaining errors.
1Following, we will focus  on the political economy of international
pollution using a public choice approach.  First, we will develop a
theoretical framework that captures the incentives  of governments for
regulation of pollution by domestic  industries.  Then, we will discuss  the
incentive structure of countries  for international cooperation in
transboundary pollution control.  We will conclude with a brief discussion
of some practical implications for policy coordination.
2.  A Public Choice Approach to  International Pollution
The theoretical framework focuses on domestic pollution control policy
decisions  in the presence of transfrontier movements of pollutants.  We
will adopt the nomenclature of economics and refer to pollution as
externality.  The models represent supply-side approaches to policy
modeling in that  they are based on the political economic calculus of the
regulator as the supplier of environment policy.1 Following, a non-
cooperative model based on Nash behavior will be developed.  The results
of this model will then be compared with a cooperative solution.
Symbols
W  = policy maker's utility
V  - political support
Uc -utility  of consumers
7b  - profit of producers
,c  - income of consumers
b  - externality  (bad)
bd  - domestic externality consumed domestically
1 Notice that political economic models  typically result in optima
different from social welfare optima.
2be  = domestic externality exported to and consumed in third countries
bm  - externality from abroad;  imported externality
bt - total externality consumed domestically
2.1  A Nash Model
In this section of the paper the amount the externality from abroad
is  considered given by the regulator (b m - bm).  As will become evident,
this assumption implies  in a Nash equilibrium from which the regulator can
not deviate unilaterally without being worse-off.  Following, the
domestically produced externality that is  consumed abroad will be referred
to as  'exported' and the domestically consumed externality from abroad as
'imported'.
Assume a single regulator's strictly concave utility function that
contains as arguments the political support from consumers and from a
group of producers  that also produce an externality in the form of
pollution.  The political support of the regulator from producers  and
consumers can be thought of as votes.  Campaign contributions and other
lobbying activities can be seen as  generating votes from these two groups.
(1) W - W  (Vb,  V,)
The regulator maximizes utility subject to the following two concave
constraints:
(2)  Vb  <  Vb  (r*b  +  rb  (b))
(3) Vc Vc (Uc  [C(c  ), bd ,  b,  )
where
(4)  bd  - . b
(5) o <  < 1
3Eqs.  (2) and (3) represent the political economic constraints that the
regulator faces.  According to eq.  (2) the political support of producers
is  a function of their total profits where I*b  denotes  the actual profits
when the externality is  internalized, and  rb  denotes the  additional
profits  that result from  the production of the externality, where  rb  is a
positive  function of b.  Denote the externality at  the private optimum as
b, then total profits  at the private optimum are the profits  at the social
optimum  (where b-s) plus  the additional profits  that result  if the output
of the externality  is not regulated and the  industry produces at  the
private optimum:2
(6)  eb  - W b  + rb  (b).
In eq.  (3),  the regulator's political support from consumers  is  a
positive function of consumers' utility, where the utility  is a positive
function of consumer incomes and a negative function of the amount of the
externality that  is consumed domestically.  Consumer incomes  are related
to  producer incomes.  How close  this relationship  is  depends on the share
of total  inputs owned by consumers  that are used in the externality
producing  industry.  It also depends on the structure of the markets for
production factors, as this determines how much the price and/or use  of a
production factor changes when profits change.
In eq.  (4),  the total externality produced is  consumed in fixed
proportions by domestic and foreign consumers.  That is b - bd  + be where
bd  is  defined as  in eq.  (4) and, therefore, be - (1-p)  b.  If f  - 1, the
externality is only consumed domestically;  in this case,  the maximization
2 As we have formulated the model  such that the externality may
partially or  in total affect foreign countries,  the term social optimum
refers  to a global social optimum in the tradition of welfare  economics.
4problem is  reduced to one of optimal regulation of domestic pollution.  If
- 0 the  externality is entirely exported to  third countries.
The solution to this maximization problem is:
(7)  (aw/avb)  . (aVb/arb)  (ab/ab)  +  (aw/av,)  . (ave/au,)  . (au,/ar)
(anr/ab)  . (8ba/8b)
- (aw/av,)  . (av,/au,)  . (au./abd)  .B
Eq.  (7) has  an obvious political economic  interpretation.  It can also
serve as a basis for the formulation of hypotheses  about the political
economic optimum amount of the externality.
The  two terms of  the sum on the left hand side of eq.  (7) represent
the marginal political economic benefits of a growing output of the
externality.  These benefits arise via increased political  support from
producers and/or consumers as  their incomes grow with increasing b.  The
right hand side of eq.  (7)  represents  the marginal political economic
costs of increasing the output of b, as consumers' utility is negatively
affected by an increase  in the consumption of the externality.  Hence, the
optimal amount of b is  chosen such that the marginal political economic
benefit of an increase  in b equals  its marginal political economic cost.
According to eq.  (7),  any change in the control variable has a
distinct effect on the political support by the industry that produces the
externality.  A reduction of b results  in declining profits  and thus
reduced political support  from the industry.  A decline  in b raises
consumers' utility, but simultaneously it may also have the opposite
effect.  In particular, consumer income, and thus  consumer utility,
declines as a consequence of declining profits  in the polluting industry.
Hence,  the net change  in political support from consumers that results
from a reduction in b  is not determined a priori.  The direction of its
5change  is  determined by the aggregate effects of the  respective partial
derivatives in eq.  (7).
The political economic optimum condition for the regulator's  control
variable b  in eq.  (7) can be  illustrated graphically.  Denote
(8) A - (aW/aVb)  . (b/a  b)  (8rb/8b)
(9) B - (aw/av,)  . (av,/8au,  . (auca8c) . (a/,a  a  rb)  (a  /ab)
(10)  C  --  (aw/av,)  . (V  (ava)  (auabd)  .
In figure 1, the horizontal axis denotes the quantity of the
externality and the vertical axis denotes the marginal political economic
costs  and benefits  of deviating from the social welfare optimum (s).
In eq.  (8),  A is positive, as all partial derivatives of A are
positive.  The regulator's utility is  positively affected by an increase
in political  support from producers;  their political support grows with
increasing profits;  and producer profits are a positive function of b.
Therefore, A is  in the first quadrant.
Convexity of the constraint in eq.  (2) implies  that the private
optimum in production is  finite,  that  is,  the marginal profit of an
additional amount of the externality must be declining with increasing b,
and A  (in figure 1) has a negative slope.
Figure  1
In eq.  (9),  B represents  the marginal political economic benefits to
the regulator that result from an increase  in b via the consumer income
effect.  The sum of A and B represents the total marginal political
benefits  (MB) of an increase in the externality.  All partial derivatives
of B are non-negative  for obvious reasons.  The only partial derivative
that in reality may be zero  is  the change in consumer incomes as a
consequence of a change  in producer incomes.  This would be the case when
6the price of consumer owned inputs  or its  quantity is not affected by the
change in producer profits  either because of a lack of consumers' market
power on input markets, or if all inputs  of producers are owned by non-
consumers  (e.g. foreigners).  As long as none of the partial derivatives
is negative B is  in the first quadrant.
The slope of B is negative  for the  same reason that A's  slope is
negative.  Hence, the total marginal political economic benefit of
deviating from the  social optimum (the sum of A + B) decline with
increasing b.
C represents the marginal political economic costs  (MC) of a growing
deviation from the social optimum via the loss in political support from
domestic consumers that  is  the consequence of the  increasing disutility of
consuming bd.  For reasons discussed above the first two derivatives are
positive, while 8Uc/abd  is obviously negative.  As the expression on the
right hand side of eq.(10)  is negative, C must be  in the  first quadrant.
The slope of C is non-negative  and determined by P  as defined as eq.  (5).3
All other things being equal,  the slopes of the curves  are given by
arb/8b and 6  respectively.  The position of the curves  in space is
determined by the other components  that determine the political economic
costs and benefits of government regulation of the externality,  that  is,
these partial derivatives act as  shifters  of one or more of the curves  in
figure 1.  According to eq.  (7) the political economic equilibrium is
determined by the intersection of MB (-A + B) and MC  (-C).  In figure 1,
this  is  the case at b°.
30f course, if f  - 0 the entire  amount of the externality is
'exported' the private and the political economic optimum are identical.
7The model discussed here has several  implications for the amount of
the externality produced domestically which are as follows:
(i) Political weights (aw/avb:  8w/avL):  The marginal political
weight of consumers  do not determine, a priori, how much of  the
externality will be produced at the political economic optimum.  This  is
the case because consumer utility declines with increasing b.  However,
consumers may also benefit from the production of b via Wc (b).  That is
aw/aV c affects both MB and MC.  For instance,  a growing marginal political
weight of consumers would not only shift MC to  the  left but would also
shift B and thus MB (-A + B) to  the right.  Whether this results  in an
increase or decline of the optimal b depends on the magnitude of these
shifts, which are also affected by the other components of B and C.
This can easily be illustrated by rewriting eq.  (7) as  follows:
(7a)  (aW/aVb)  (aVb/arb)  (a8b/ab) =
- (aw/av,  ( av,/auc)  *  [(auc/ar  ,)  *  (aRo/awb)  (airb/ab)
+(aUc/abd)  p
In eq.  (7a),  the  left hand side depicts  the marginal political
economic benefits of deviating from the social optimum via growing support
from producers, whereas  the right hand side contains the net cost of doing
so via changing political support from consumers.  As the first  three
partial derivatives in brackets are larger than or equal to zero while
aUC/abd < 0 and O <  P  < 1, the sum in brackets can be positive or
negative and thus can be the net political support from consumers;  that
is,  whether the net support from consumers  is positive or negative  is
determined by the expression in brackets on the right hand side of eq.
(7a) where  the marginal political weight attached to consumers acts as  a
multiplier (as  does aVc/aBU;  see below).  Of course, a regulator who  is
8indifferent with regard to  the origin of the votes will attach the same
weights to  producers and consumers.
The effect of the marginal political weight of producers  is
unambiguous.  The larger the weight  the larger will be the obtimum b.
(ii)  Political influence of producers  (8Vb/arb):  All other things
being equal,  the more sensitive  the political support  from producers  is to
changes  in profits  (aVb/arb)  the farther A  (and thus MB) will be to the
right in figure 1 and the higher will be b.  According to a central
hypothesis  of public choice  theory, a group can be expected to react the
more pronounced with political support and thus will be the more
influencial the more efficiently it can organize  its  lobbying efforts.
Typically, relatively small groups, groups with fairly homogenous
interests, groups  that can supply  its members with selective benefits, or
those which have low costs of organizing a lobby for other reasons  (e.g.
because they are  regionally concentrated) are more successful on political
economic markets  (see Olson, 1965).
(iii) Political influence of consumers  (8OV/LU 0 . Arguments  similar
to  (i) and  (ii) hold for the determinants of the marginal change in
political  support from consumers when their utility changes.  Group
characteristics determine the sensitivity of political support  to changes
in consumer utility.  However, the direction of impact on the optimum b
can not be determined a priori;  aV,/  aUo acts  as a multiplier and the
direction of  its  impact depends on whether  the expression in brackets on
the right-hand side of eq.  (7a) is positive or negative.
(iv) Income level  (aU/abd;:  aUV/rc).:  It appears  immediately
plausible  that the marginal utility of consuming the externality and the
marginal utility of income depend on the  income level.  The higher the
9income the larger  is  the marginal disutility of consuming the externality
(aUC/abd),  and the smaller  is  the marginal utility of income  (8Uc/a8c)
generated by an additional unit of the externality.  In figure 1, the
higher  the income level the more will both MC and MB be to  the left and
thus the lower will be the optimal b, all other things being equal.
Hence, one can expect the regulation of a negative externality to become
tighter when incomes rise.
It appears plausible that there  is some kind of  'dilution effect';
i.e.  that  the marginal disutility of consumers resulting from an increase
in the output of the externality also is  affected by a size  factor.  The
more of a natural resource  is available  the  less will an additional unit
of the externality affect the average pollution of the resource and the
lower will be consumers' marginal disutility and thus  the optimum b.
To  illustrate this,  assume two countries,  one having a large  inland
lake and one having a  small inland lake.  The  countries are  identical
otherwise and the externality affects  the use of the  lake by consumers.
Of course,  any given quantity of b  affects the  lake quality per unit of
water less  in the country with the  large lake than in the other country.
Hence, the  scarcer the natural resource that is  affected by the
externality the more will MC be to the left in figure 1 and the  lower will
be the optimum b, ceteris paribus.
(v) Structure of  input market  (8rC/aLb)-  The marginal change  in
consumer incomes as a consequence of a profit change in the  industry that
produces the externality and thus the position of B is  affected by the
structure of the  input market and the amount of production factors of the
industry that is  owned by consumers.  The  latter, of course, is  also
influenced by the size of the industry in terms  of employment.
10The structure of the input market directly affects  the incidence  of
consumer incomes and the profit of producers and thus ac/ 8 arb.  Curve B
will be further to  the left and the optimum b will be the lower the  less
factor prices and/or total factor inputs  increase with growing profits.
For instance,  if the capital of producers  is predominantly owned by
foreigners  and/or the share in total employment is  small a change in
profits will only marginally affect domestic consumers.  Therefore, such
industries will face relatively tight environmental regulation, all  other
things being equal.
(vi) Sensitivity of producer incomes  to environmental regulation
(arb/ab):  The more  sensitive producer profits are  to changes  in b the
more inelastic will be both A and B in figure  1.  With increasing
sensitivity of producer profits environmental regulation will be  less
affected by a shift of MC to  the left.  Hence, one can expect that  those
industries which are  crucially dependent on a process  that results
in the externality will face less tight environmental regulation than
those which can more easily substitute such a production process, ceteris
paribus.
(vii) Domestic consumption and export of the externality  (B):  In eq.
(10),  P  represents the share of the total output of the externality that
is consumed domestically.  If P  is zero, that  is,  if the externality is
consumed entirely by foreigners the marginal political economic costs  of
environmental regulation are zero unless either altruism  is  introduced or
some form of strategic behavior with regard to mutually exported
externalities.4 With increasing P  less of the externality is  exported
and more  is consumed domestically and the  slope of MC in figure  1
4 We will come back to this  issue in the next section.
11increases.  Consequently, the optimum will be at a lower b.  For B  - 1,
the externality  is entirely consumed domestically.  If in addition to  this
there  is no import of  the externality from abroad the problem is  reduced
to  one of the political economic optimal environmental  regulation in a
closed country with no transfrontier movements of the externality.
(viii)  Import of the externality  (bm,)  When domestic  consumers are
affected by an exogenously given externality from abroad that cannot be
avoided, MC  in figure 1 shifts to MC',  where the difference between MC'
and MC results from the  loss  in political support by consumers who also
consume  the  imported externality.  As  a consequence, the political
economic optimum would shift to the  left  (b');  that  is,  the optimal
domestic output of the externality is  lower in the presence of a given
externality from abroad.  From figure 1, it  is  also clear that any
reduction in the externality from abroad increases the domestic political
economic optimum output of b.
2.2  A Cooperative Model
In a two country world, cooperation,  as  it  is  defined here,  implies
that one country agrees to reduce  the domestic  output of an externality
that also affects  the other country provided the other country does  the
same.  This  is,  the amount of the externality from abroad is  a positive
function of the export and thus  the domestic output of the externality
(eqs.  (11)  and 12)).
(11) bm  - bm  (b.(b))
where
(12)  8bm/8ab  > o
12Notice that non-cooperative, non-Nash behavior would imply abm/abe  < 0.
The basic  idea behind eqs.  (11)  and  (12)  is  analogous to explaining
the provision of public goods  (e.g. Runge, 1984).  It has been formally
anlayzed in the theory of reciprocity which stipulates  that every economic
agent is obliged to contribute more to the production of a public good
conditional upon others doing the  same  (Sugden, 1984).  The domestic
regulator's maximization problem now is different from before  in one of
the constraints:
(13) W - W  (Vb,  V,)
s.t.
(14)  Vb  - Vb  [irb  +  b (b)]
(15)  Vc - VC  (UC  [cr  (Orb  +  rb(b)),  bd  (b),  bm  (b,(b))]}
The resulting optimum condition is:
(16)  (aw/aVb)  . (aVb/ab)  . (a 8 b/ab)  +  (aW/av)  (a8V/aU,)  (aU,/a8ir)
(ar./a7rb)  . (a/ab)
-- (aw/av,)  (aV./aU,)  (au,/abd)  19
-(aw/avc)  (av,/au,)  (au,/abr)  *  (abm/ab,)  (ab,/ab)
To  simplify  the  notation  let  ab./abe  - - where  - is  given.  Obviously,  as
1  - abd/ab,  it  follows  that  ab,/ab - 1 - . If  consumers'  disutility  of
consuming  the  externality  is  indifferent  with  regard  to  the  country  of
origin  then  auc/abm - aUc/abd.  To  simplify  matters  further,  let  the
environmental  regulator  be  indifferent  with  regard  to  the  origin  of
political  supports,  i.e.  aW/aVc - aw/aVb.
Hence  eq.  (16)  becomes:
(17)  (aVb/ab)  (arb/ab)  +  (aV/au,)  *  (auc,/r,)
(arC,/arb)  (arb/ab)
-- (ac/auc)  *  (aUC/abd)  [B +  7(1-1)]
13If - = 0, eq.  (17)  represents  the political economic optimum discussed in
the previous  section.  For - < 0 and 0 < P  < 1, eq.  (17)  is  the non-
cooperative, non-Nash solution. If p-1, eq.  (17)  is  identical  to  eq.  (7)
as well.  However, this  is not a particularly interesting case to study
cooperation, as  there would be no exports of the externality to other
countries.  Therefore, the range of 8  will be restricted in the following
to 0 <  . < 1.
The case of interest is  the cooperative solution where - > 0.
Obviously,  if f  + (1-)y  - 1, then the optimal domestic output of the
externality  is equal  to the case  in which the  domestic externality would
be completely consumed domestically with no  externality from abroad.  The
reason for this result  is  that in this  case any change in the domestic
output of the externality  is  followed by an equal change  in the  total
domestic consumption in the externality from both domestic production and
from abroad;  in other words, the change in the exported externality would
equal the change in the externality from abroad.  Obviously, this result
occurs when y-1;  i.e.,  when two countries have negotiated an equal
reduction in the mutual export (and thus  import) of the externality.5
If the negotiated  y is such that 0 < - < 1 (7 > 1) the optimal degree
of cooperation would result in a production of the externality in any
country which is  larger (smaller) than the one  that would prevail  in the
absence of transboundary movements of the externality.  The reason is
simply that when O<7<l  (7>1) a reduction in the export of the externality
by one unit results  in a decline in the import of the externality by less
(more) than one unit.
5 The expression is  equal to one also  if p-1.  As mentioned above
this case has been excluded from discussion here.
14The potential  for cooperation can be  illustrated graphically by
deriving for a single country the domestic political economic rents  in
international pollution.  In figure 2, the horizontal axis  denotes the
various components  of the externality and the vertical axis denotes  the
marginal political economic costs and benefits.  The marginal  cost curve
MC is based on the assumption that bm - bm  > o  and o >  3  > 1.  The
political economic optimum amount of domestic production of  the
externality is b° .
If the externality from abroad would be zero the marginal cost curve
would be to the  right and parallel  to MC  (MC - bm).  Therefore, the
domestic production plus  the  import of the externality are b° + b°.  If
the  total  domestic  output  of  the  externality  would  be  consumed
domestically  the  resulting  marginal  cost  curve  would be  MC + be;  hence,
the  difference between domestic  production  and export of  the  externality
would be b° - b°.  Total domestic consumption is b°  - b° + b°  - b°.  In
figure 2 the net export of the externality happens to be negative  and
therefore bE > b° . Of course, net imports can be positive as well.
Figure 2
As MB represents the marginal political economic benefits of deviating
from  the  social  optimum  the  area  under  MB  from  s  to  b° represents  the
total political economic benefit of regulating the output of the
externality at  b° . By analogy, the area under  the MC from s to b°
represents the total cost of allowing the production b° . Hence,  the
political  economic rent  at the optimum is  represented by the area sax.
As mentioned earlier, the assumption that bm - bm  implies a Nash
equilibrium.  Hence, the environmental regulator cannot deviate
15unilaterally from b' without being worse off.  However, a coordination of
regulation between this  country and the country  from which bm  is  imported
may have  the potential to  increase  the domestic political economic rents.
Policy coordination, as it has been defined here,  implies an agreement
on a mutual reduction in the production, and thus,  export of the
externality to the respective  other country.  Let MC' represent the total
marginal cost under policy coordination which implies  that abm/abe  > o.
The new political economic optimum output is b . Of course,  in a two
country world the negotiated - must result in b'  b° in order to be
acceptable for the other country
In order to be acceptable  for the country depicted here the negotiated
y  must result in a gain in political economic  rents.  That  is,  sax' >
s'ax, which obviously  is the case  in figure 2, as  the horizontally shaded
area is clearly smaller than the vertically shaded area.
Non-identical countries which differ much,  (e.g. because of
preferences, income level, political  system, technology or extent of the
exported and imported externality) may not cooperate without one country
directly compensating the other.  In these cases, one country's regulator
may benefit from a mutual reduction in the output of the externality while
the other may not.  Hence, a bilateral agreement may only be brought about
if the compensation that  the benefiting country is willing to provide
exceeds  the reduction of political economic rents  in the other country.
Figure 3
The essence  of this  kind of cooperation can be illustrated graphically
as well.  Figure  3 depicts such a situation which is  typical of
undirectional air  or water pollution where one country pollutes  (at least)
one other country but does not receive pollution from  this country.  This
16case is  quite  common in the pollution of rivers that cross jurisdictional
boundaries as well as in airsheds with prevailing winds from one
direction.
In figure  3, it has been assumed that  the country depicted does not
export any externality at all;  i.e.,  P  - 1 and thus b. - o.  Moreoever, MC
and MB intersect at  s (-b0-bd),  and production occurs  at the social
optimum.  As there  is  a given externality from abroad  (b,  - bt),  the
regulator could gain by a reduction in bm . However, as  b. - o, this
country cannot offer a reduction in exports of the externality in exchange
for reduced imports  from abroad.  Still,  there  is a potential for
international cooperation, as  it may be possible to  induce the other
country to reduce  the externality via a direct transfer to  (consumers
and/or producers  in)  the other country.  Here cooperation would imply that
one country is willing to  reduce  its exports of the externality
conditional upon the other (non-polluting) country making compensating
payments.  If the willingness  to  transfer income from this country to  the
other country is high enough to compensate for the loss  in political
economic rents resulting from a reduction in output of  the externality,
regulators  in both countries can gain from such a transfer and cooperation
would occur.6
A similar situation in which this form of cooperation may be brought
about is  the common resource use by high and low income countries.  Due to
high incomes the marginal political benefits of a more generous
environmental regulation are relatively low whereas the marginal cost of
doing so tend to be high.  Hence, wealthy countries  tend to  do more to
6 Notice that his cooperative solution to an international pollution
problem is not in accordance with the popular normative  "polluter pays"
principle.
17constrain the domestic consumption of an externality, all other things
being equal.  Regulators in high income countries may well increase  their
political economic rents by buying out a low  income country's  right to
(produce and thus)  export the  externality.7
3.  Summary and Conclusion
The analysis  in this  paper suggests  several reasons for the existence
of policies that allow the private sector to  deviate  from the social
optimum if there  are externalities  in production.  If part of the
domestically produced externality  is exported to  third countries  total
domestic output of the externality is higher than in the case in which  the
total domestic production of the externality  is consumed domestically.
The additional externality from abroad leads  to  a somewhat lower
domestic output of the externality but to a higher total consumption.
This  represents  an incentive for policy coordination.  The incentive
effect is  due,  in essence,  to a leverage effect;  regulators  in each
country can gain politically by a joint reduction in the production of the
externality, as any reduction in the domestic production  (and thus export)
of the externality results in a reduction of the externality from abroad
as well.
The existing incentives for coordination in international pollution
control policies, however, do not imply that such cooperation will
actually occur.  Besides transactions costs which can be substantial and
which can inhibit international cooperation each country involved needs
assurance over other countries  compliance under an agreement and the
7In these or  analogous cases cooperation may also be brought about by
widening the scope  of the negotiations.
18distribution of the net benefits of international pollution control
policies need to be perceived as  fair.
Any agreement on international policy cooperation consists of a set
of rules that specifies  the signatories' rights  and obligations.  Such an
agreement represents a global public good.  Public  goods are frequently
difficult to supply efficiently because of free-riding.  The  free-rider
problem can be solved in principle, however, through a system of
conditional commitments to  contribute to  the production of a public good
(Sugden, 1984).  Each economic agent would contribute  to the production of
a public  good conditional upon others doing the same.  The key for
international agreements on transboundary pollution is  that they have to
provide the assurance that everybody  'plays by the rules'  (Sen, 1967).
This assurance  is crucial  for the production of any public good (Runge
1984).
Moreover, a public good will only be produced if there  is agreement on
the distribution of its benefits.  To date, economic  theory can only
predict the range of outcomes of negotiations over  the benefits of such
agreements in principle, which is usually  illustrated using Edgeworth
diagrams.  Recent advances  in economic theory, however, may help to
further narrow the range of distributions that is  acceptable to the
parties involved (e.g. Baumol,  1982).
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Figure  1:  The marginal political economic benefits and costs of  government
regulation of a negative externality.
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Figure 2:  The potential  for  international cooperation  in  transboundary
pollution control.
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